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1. Introduction
Russia and China may now be experiencing a pivotal moment in 
their post‐Cold War relationship, which will determine whether they 
will shift from a non‐committal partnership to a strategic alliance. 
Being the two strongest powers on the Eurasian landmass, the state 
of the Russia – China relationship is of profound significance for the 
world’s largest continent, and particularly for its Asian side, where 
Beijing displays growing ambitions. 
The paper investigates the evolution of Russo‐Chinese strategic 
relationship – from its beginnings in the mid‐1990s to the present, 
focusing on the motives that have lately been driving Beijing and 
Moscow ever closer, above all their respective antagonisms with 
* This work was supported by Seoul National University, American Studies Institute.
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Washington. It then goes on to assess possible implications that Sino‐
Russian entente may have for Asian security order. In conclusion, 
three basic scenarios are outlined of possible future configurations in 
the Russia‐China‐US strategic triangle and their impact on the Asian 
balance of power.
(1) The beginning of the “strategic partnership”
In the immediate aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 
Sino‐Russian relationship experienced a brief period of uncertainty. 
The newly democratic Moscow was eager to join the West, to which 
it looked as the political and economic model. Russia’s President 
Boris Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev were more 
than willing to act in lockstep with the United States, Western 
Europe, and the Western‐led institutions. Understandably, this caused 
great concern in Beijing. For one, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
was viewed there as a serious blow to the communist ideology with 
potentially adversarial consequences for the CCP’s rule. Beijing also 
feared that, with Russia joining the Western liberal camp, China’s 
isolation in the wake of the Tiananmen events would become even 
more complete. The geopolitical triangle of Washington‐Beijing‐
Moscow, which China had so skillfully exploited since the early 
1970s, threatened to reconfigure in such a radical way as to leave 
Beijing out in the cold facing the triumphant West. This would doom 
the PRC to the pariah status in international community. 
To Chinese rulers’ relief, these fears never materialized. The new 
Kremlin inhabitants had no intention of antagonizing or alienating 
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China, even for the sake of proving Russia’s newfound democratic 
credentials. After a short pause, Boris Yeltsin continued Gorbachev’s 
course aimed at improving relations with Beijing.1) In December 
1992, Yeltsin visited Beijing (with Jiang Zemin reciprocating in 
September 1994). By contrast, Yeltsin’s maiden visit to Tokyo, which 
had been scheduled to take place ahead of China’s trip, in September 
1992, was abruptly cancelled by the Russian side because of the 
Kremlin’s unwillingness to make concessions on the South Kuril 
Islands dispute, which the Japanese saw as the main item on the 
bilateral agenda. It was an early indication that China, not Japan, was 
going to be Russia’s main friend in Asia. 
The mid‐1990s marked a watershed in Russia’s foreign policy. 
Russia began to feel bitter disappointment, and even anger, with the 
West. It was seen as treating Russia as a defeated adversary which 
could at best be a junior partner in the Western‐dominated order. The 
list of major Russian grievances included NATO’s eastern 
enlargement, lack of economic aid from the West, and refusal to 
grant Moscow its rightful place in the international system. 
Disenchantment with the West induced Moscow to seek closer ties 
with the PRC, which, for its part, was happy to embrace Russia. 
This was manifested in Yeltsin’s visit to China in April 1996, during 
which the two sides stated their intention to develop “relations of an 
1) That said, there were moments in the early 1990s when the Kremlin’s chaotic 
decision‐making put Russo‐Chinese relations at risk. The most serious incident 
happened in 1992 when one of Yeltsin’s trusted aides persuaded him to sign a 
decree allowing the opening of Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Moscow, which 
was almost tantamount to recognizing Taipei. The scandalous decision was 
quickly reversed after protests from China backed by Russia’s ministry of 
foreign affairs. 
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equal trustworthy partnership aimed at strategic partnership in the 21st 
century” (Alexander Lukin “The Russian Approach” 148). Yeltsin 
declared that there were no more controversial questions between 
Russia and China and from that time onward the strategic partnership 
became official policy for the two countries (Alexander Lukin “The 
Russian Approach” 148). In April 1997, in Moscow, Yeltsin and 
Jiang signed Declaration on a Multipolar World and Formation of a 
New International Order, where they stated their common vision 
which was in clear opposition to the US‐centered hegemony. 
Another reason for Russia’s shift toward China was the desire to 
gain economic benefits by expanding trade with its fast‐growing 
economy. Whereas in the early 1990s China’s economic prospects 
looked uncertain and the West appeared the only option for trade and 
investment, by the second half of the 1990s the economic rise of the 
PRC, and its potential, was beyond doubt. 
(2) The strategic partnership under Putin
Vladimir Putin, who succeeded Yeltsin in 2000, continued to 
emphasize good relations with China. In June 2001, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization was launched, in whose establishment and 
further functioning Beijing and Moscow have played the role of co‐
leaders. The SCO quickly became one of Eurasia’s most important 
regional arrangements and has served as another major channel of 
Sino‐Russian collaboration.
In July 2001, Putin and Jiang signed Treaty of Good Neighborly 
Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty became the legal foundation 
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for the Sino‐Russian strategic partnership. Inter alia, the parties 
affirmed their respect for joint borders and support for the territorial 
integrity and national sovereignty of their partner. Beijing and 
Moscow declared that they did not have any territorial claims 
between themselves, vowing to turn the shared border into a “border 
of eternal peace and friendship.” The treaty pronounced that it was 
not “aimed at any third country” and its wording was careful to 
avoid any phrases that could be interpreted as anti‐American. 
Unlike the 1997 declaration, the treaty did not even mention the 
multipolar world concept. This change in tone, as compared to the 
late 1990s, was mainly attributable to Putin’s desire for closer 
relations with the West. In his early years in office, Putin saw the 
United States and Western Europe, rather than China, as Russia’s top 
partners. This became especially apparent after September 11. While 
Putin was the first foreign leader to call George W. Bush and offer 
America all necessary help, he did not speak with Jiang Zemin until 
a full week later. As Alexander Lukin (“The Russian Approach” 160) 
points out, “Russian contacts with China remained at the pre‐
September 11 level against the background of a radical intensification 
of Moscow’s relations with the United States, NATO, and Western 
Europe.” This caused apprehension in China over Russia’s possible 
shift in favor of the West. Chinese experts saw the Putin government 
as having lost enthusiasm about advocating multipolarity for fear of 
offending the Americans. Chinese security analysts were particularly 
alarmed by Moscow’s decision to allow Central Asian countries to 
grant the United States access to their territory and airspace to wage 
war in Afghanistan. The Chinese also took notice of Russia’s 
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increasing tolerance of NATO’s eastward expansion (Li 160).
Moscow’s somewhat reduced eagerness for engagement with 
Beijing was also evident in the geo‐economic sphere. In 2002, when 
a major state‐owned oil company, Slavneft, was put up for 
privatization, the Russian government publicly refused to sell it to 
CNPC, although the Chinese oil giant offered the highest bid 
(Danilov). Another high‐profile controversy involved the projected oil 
pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China. An agreement to build a 
pipeline from Russian Angarsk to Daqing in northeastern China was 
reached in 2001, but just a few months later Moscow began 
negotiating with Tokyo an alternative route to Nakhodka on the 
Pacific Coast, targeting Japan and the United States, rather than 
China, as main consumers of the Eastern Siberian oil. Not surprisingly, 
those about‐faces by Moscow caused consternation in Beijing. Some 
cooling in the relationship did not preclude Russia and China from 
signing an agreement in 2004 that formally completed the long 
process of border settlement between the two countries. The agreement 
decided the ownership of several remaining islands and islets on 
Amur River which had been left undetermined by the 1991 Soviet‐
Chinese border treaty. 
By the mid‐2000s Sino‐Russian political relationship began to pick 
up steam again. This was largely due to visible deterioration of 
relations between Russia and the West. The Putin administration felt 
that its goodwill and concessions were not reciprocated by Washington. 
The West would not recognize Russia as an equal partner and 
continued what the Kremlin perceived as a brazen encroachment upon 
Russia’s sphere of vital interests in its “near abroad.” The Putin 
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government was especially alarmed by the “color revolutions” that took 
place in Georgia, Ukraine and Kirgizstan, viewing them as engineered 
by the State Department. By then Russia, buttressed by the strong 
economic performance on the back of high hydrocarbon prices, had 
enough confidence to stand up to the West. Putin’s Munich speech in 
February 2007 was a stark warning that Moscow was prepared to pick 
a fight. This necessitated a new closeness with Beijing. One of the 
initial signs of the stronger Russia‐China partnership was the SCO’s 
collective decision in July 2005 to call on the United States to 
withdraw its military bases from Central Asia. 
In a curious reversal of roles from the early 2000s, Russia began 
to act increasingly anti‐American, while China was quite cautious, 
reluctant to support the combative drive of Putin’s Munich 
statements. China made it clear that it was not ready to side with 
Russia in her tensions with the United States so as not to jeopardize 
Beijing’s all‐important relations with Washington. The Chinese 
leadership under Hu Jintao was also somewhat uncomfortable with 
Moscow’s recalcitrant rhetoric and actions as they obviously did not 
fit with Beijing’s concept of the “harmonious world” (Portyakov). 
This stance was manifest in the wake of the August 2008 war that 
Russia waged against Georgia. Beijing conspicuously declined to 
approve of Moscow’s actions and did not recognize the independence 
of Russian‐backed South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A temporary decline 
in the political dimension of the Sino‐Russian partnership led some 
observers to the conclusion that, after having passed its peak in 
around 2005, the relationship would be experiencing “growing distrust 
and complexity” (Hyodo 44‐53). 
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However, by 2012, Russian and Chinese views on the core issues 
of international politics began to converge again. Russia’s anti‐
Western posture remained more or less unchanged, so the main 
change occurred in China’s foreign policies. The 2008‐09 recession 
that wreaked havoc on the West seemed to have given Beijing 
confidence that the balance of power was inexorably moving in its 
favor. This coincided with leadership transition in the PRC. The 
cautious and uncharismatic Hu Jintao was succeeded by the much 
tougher and seemingly more nationalistic Xi Jinping, whose foreign 
policy bore discernible features of great‐power offensive realism. 
China’s growing geopolitical ambitions, particularly in East Asia, 
were clearly at odds with what America stood for. Russia and China 
now almost equally shared in anti‐Americanism, turning their strategic 
partnership into a quasi‐alliance. 
The reinvigorated Sino‐Russian entente amply displayed itself, when 
the two countries blocked the Western‐backed UN vote on Syria in 
2012. The Ukraine crisis, which started to develop in the fall of 
2013, further consolidated Moscow‐Beijing axis. China’s response to 
the developments around Ukraine was telling. Ever since the crisis 
began to unfold, the Chinese media tended to blame Western 
meddling for what was happening there. There was no sign 
whatsoever of Beijing’s condemnation of the Kremlin’s moves in 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. China’s official press commentary was 
sympathetic with Moscow, stressing that Putin’s determination to 
protect the interests of Russia and Russian‐speaking citizens is “quite 
understandable” (“Commentary”). Many of China’s netizens blogging 
on the websites, such as Weibo, displayed admiration for Putin’s 
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defiance of the West.
Beijing’s abstention at the UN Security Council vote on Crimea 
could hardly be interpreted as opposition to Russia. In fact, Beijing 
made it quite clear that it disapproved of using the UN stage to 
pressure Russia. What was even more important was that China ruled 
out any possibility that it might join political and economic sanctions 
against Russia. In terms of international diplomacy, such a stance by 
China could be interpreted as nothing other than benevolent neutrality 
toward the Kremlin.
Putin’s visits to Shanghai in May 2014 and Beijing in November 
2014, as well as other multiple Russia‐China high‐level meetings 
during the year, underscored the growing closeness between the two 
powers – despite, or perhaps because of, the Ukraine mess. The two 
sides concluded a host of agreements, substantially expanding and 
deepening their cooperation in, among other fields, energy, finance, 
and high‐tech sector. The strengthened ties between Moscow and 
Beijing were epitomized by a 30‐year 400 billion USD mega deal to 
supply natural gas from Eastern Siberia to northeastern China, 
followed a few months later by another long‐term agreement that 
would allow China to receive gas from Western Siberia (“Russia”). 
2. Russia’s threat perception: between the Occident 
and the Orient
It is certainly true that both Russia’s governing elites and ordinary 
people are wary of China. During the past two centuries Russia was 
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more advanced and powerful as compared to China, encouraging the 
Russians to think of the Middle Kingdom somewhat condescendingly. 
That traditional perception is now being painfully reassessed. Russian 
leaders are steeped in the balance‐of‐power politics. They strongly 
believe in the maxim that what really matters in international arena 
are capabilities rather than intentions. From this perspective, some 
form of entente with the US to insure against the growing Chinese 
power could make sense (see, for example, Mearsheimer). Besides, 
many would argue that Russia, for all its Asiatic elements, 
historically and culturally leans more toward Europe and the West. 
The main problem with such arguments, though, is that the US‐led 
West is seen by Moscow as a bigger, and more immediate, threat 
than China. There are four principal reasons for that.
First, the West is widely perceived as seeking to transform Russia 
in its own image, so that Russia would lose its core identity. Efforts 
by the US and EU to export democracy and liberal values are 
viewed as aggressive moves designed to undermine the ideational and 
institutional foundations of Russia’s statehood. By contrast, Moscow 
highly appreciates China’s principle of non‐interference in other 
countries’ affairs and its tolerance of diverse models of political and 
socio‐economic development. 
Second, ever since the 1990s Moscow has been worried about the 
West’s penetration of Russia’s “near abroad”, that is the territory of 
the former Soviet Union that the Kremlin deems its sphere of 
influence. The tensions spiked under the George W. Bush 
administration, culminating in the 2008 brief war between Russia and 
Georgia, a U.S. ally. Under Obama, Washington somewhat reduced 
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its involvement in the post‐Soviet space. Nevertheless, the Kremlin 
remains deeply suspicious of the U.S. intentions in Russia’s backyard. 
For example, Moscow was deeply offended by Hillary Clinton’s 
remarks that the United States would try to prevent the Russian‐led 
re‐integration of the post‐Soviet space (Clover). The Ukraine crisis of 
2013‐14 only served to underscore the depth of divisions between 
Russia and the West over the future of the post‐Soviet countries.
China has also been increasing its engagement with the former 
Soviet republics, especially in Central Asia. Yet, it has been careful 
not to provoke Russian ire. China’s links to post‐Soviet states has 
mainly been economic, not challenging Russia’s residual political 
hegemony. As opposed to the US‐sponsored color revolutions, Beijing 
has never acted against the post‐Soviet ruling regimes with close ties 
to the Kremlin or tried to establish military presence in the former 
Soviet Union. To be sure, Moscow is not particularly happy about 
Beijing’s growing economic leverage over Central Asian republics, 
but is willing to put up with it as long as China respects Russian 
strategic interests in this area. 
Third, America’s military strategy is a more serious concern to 
Russia than China’s. In particular, NATO’s missile defense program 
causes grave apprehensions in Moscow. There is a strong opinion 
within the national strategic establishment that once completed, the 
missile shield will be able to negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent. On 
the contrary, China’s current military posture is assessed as less of a 
security risk to Russia, because Beijing’s defense modernization and 
deployments are principally aimed at the Taiwan Strait, South China 
Sea, and the Western Pacific. 
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Fourthly, foreign policy rhetoric and diplomatic style matter a lot 
in shaping Moscow’s threat perceptions. America is not shy talking 
about its being the sole superpower and its determination to lead the 
world, which evokes much irritation in Russia. Meanwhile, China 
endorses the idea of a diverse and multi‐polar world, wholly backed 
by Moscow. Furthermore, actions and words by American high‐profile 
politicians and diplomats often contribute to America’s image as a 
country adversarial to Russia. For example, Mitt Romney, a man who 
had a chance of becoming the next President of the United States, 
repeatedly labeled Russia as America’s top “geopolitical foe”. Mike 
McFaul, the former U.S. ambassador in Moscow, had a record of 
controversial gestures infuriating the Kremlin, such as meeting 
opposition leaders or publicly alleging that Moscow paid “bribes” to 
Central Asian leaders (“Ambassador”). It is simply impossible to 
imagine Chinese top politicians and diplomats behaving that way. On 
the contrary, Beijing appears ‘hypersensitive’ to Russian sensibilities 
(Rozman 27). 
Historical aspects of the relationship should not be overlooked as 
well. Sino‐Russian relations are often portrayed as troubled, conflict‐
prone and fraught with mutual suspicions. That may be partly true, 
but one also needs to be aware of the more positive historical legacy 
in the bilateral ties. The two mighty states’ special relationship goes 
back to the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 which established a border 
between China and Russia. At that time, the treaty was unique, in 
that the Qing Empire treated the Russians as equals (Cohen 218). 
And in 1715 the Chinese imperial government permitted Moscow to 
establish a Russian Orthodox mission in Beijing, which assumed the 
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role of a de facto embassy, the only foreign mission of its kind in 
China for over a century (Kissinger 51). Significantly, Russia and 
China have never fought a major war with each other. There were, 
of course, military incidents and border clashes, but they never 
reached the scale of an all‐out warfare. 
It is also amazing how smoothly the power transition process took 
place between the two countries. Dmitri Trenin is correct to say that 
“[n]o other great‐power relationship in modern history, including the 
U.S.‐Russian one, has undergone a change so abrupt, profound and 
quick, under peacetime conditions – and no other relationship has 
undergone such a momentous change so smoothly. In terms of 
power, Russia and China have traded places and have happily 
adapted to the new situation” (Trenin 5). Trenin goes on to argue 
that this owed, in the first place, “to the management of the 
relationship by the two countries’ leaderships and elites” (Trenin 5).
The Polish scholar Alicja Curanovic notices that, especially 
considering their extremely long shared border, Russo‐Chinese 
relations are unique in their relatively harmonious and peaceful 
history. It appears that Russians have historically found ways of 
rationalizing any perceived risks from China. This stands in stark 
contrast to Russia’s relationship with the West, which has been 
consistently demonized by most Russian regimes. Throughout Russian 
history it was the West rather than the East that was perceived as 
the gravest threat. This difference, Curanovic explains, could be 
partly attributed to the religious factor. Orthodox Christianity is 
regarded as one of the essential components of “Russianness”. It is 
important that Orthodox Christianity has always emphasized 
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differences between Russia, the sanctuary of the “true faith,” and the 
renegade and apostate West, which is aggressively trying to destroy 
Russia and its identity (Curanovic). China, which has no strong 
religious affiliation, has never been seen as a spiritual threat: 
“Russians, at least partly because of the intense effort to differentiate 
themselves ideologically from Europe, could afford relatively greater 
objectivism in relations with Chinese” (Curanovic 228). “The West” 
was the dominant Other in the self‐identification of Russians, while 
relations with “the East” were mostly a function of interaction 
between Russia and the West (Curanovic 221). 
It is interesting to trace how, in the post‐Soviet Russia, the 
perception of “China threat” fluctuated depending on the state of 
relations with the West. In the 1990s and early 2000s, when there 
was still a possibility for Russia being integrated with the West, 
Russian political leaders and senior officials made statements that 
explicitly or implicitly referred to the ‘China threat.’ For instance, in 
1995 the minister of construction Yefim Basin warned in a press 
interview that the Chinese and Koreans were poised to invade the 
Russian Far East demographically turning it into “a sovereign 
republic of narrow eyes” (cited in Alexander Lukin “The Russian 
Approach” 147). In 1996, he was echoed by the defense minister 
Pavel Grachev who alerted the public that Chinese were trying to 
conquer the RFE through peaceful means (cited in Alexander Lukin 
“The Russian Approach” 147). In 2000, in Blagoveshchensk none 
other than Vladimir Putin himself talked of the menacing possibility 
that “even the indigenous Russian population in a few decades will 
speak mainly Japanese, Chinese, and Korean” (cited in “Obraz”). 
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A decade later the tone of the country’s leadership decidedly 
changed. In September 2010, Putin rejected any notion of ‘China 
threat’: 
Foreign experts keep telling us about the threat from China. We are not 
worried at all…There is the huge Far East, Eastern Siberia, an under‐
populated territory. And there is powerful China, over a billion people. We 
should be afraid. We are not afraid…There is no threat on the side of 
China…We have co‐existed with China for a thousand years. We had 
difficult moments, and at times better relations, but we know each other 
very well and we have got used to respecting each other…China does not 
have to populate the Far East and Eastern Siberia to get what it needs: 
natural resources…We have just finished the construction of an oil pipeline. 
We are ready to build two gas pipelines. We will be supplying coal to 
them…China does not want to worsen relations with us to solve its current 
goals (“Highlights”).
The consensus in the Kremlin is that, in the foreseeable future 
China will not pose a threat to Russia. This point was nicely 
summarized by General (Ret.) Leonid Reshetnikov, who heads 
Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank under Russian 
President: 
We are closely following the situation in China. Of course, this is a big 
country, where different factions exist, including expansionist ones. But we 
are confident that China is interested in good relations with Russia. China’s 
main rival is the United States, not Russia. Therefore China needs a well‐
protected and quiet rear area. For the next 30‐40 years Russia is unlikely to 
face any threat from China. Beijing is doing its best to avoid whatever 
might cause Russia’s irritation and negative reaction. A serious conflict 
between Russia and China is possible only if grave mistakes are made by us 
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or by the Chinese, or else if the American agents do a good job in China. 
The Western countries are keen to set Russia and China against each other. 
They keep forcing on us this China threat notion. Yet we will never buy 
that (Remarks by Leonid Reshetnikov 2014).  
(1) The drivers of Sino‐Russian alliance
Since its inception in the second half of the 1990s, Sino‐Russian 
strategic partnership has received varying assessments. Until recently, 
prior to the Ukraine events, the dominant view has been that it is 
“an inherently limited partnership”, which is imbalanced and fraught 
due to cultural barriers and the two countries’ significantly divergent 
interests that are likely to diverge even more in the future (Lo; 
Kotkin). Any idea of upgrading the partnership to the level of 
alliance has been rejected as unrealistic (Kuhrt). 
Yet, early on, there was also a dissenting view that saw Russo‐
Chinese collaboration as something much more durable and having 
great potential for further development. In 2001, Ariel Cohen 
characterized it as an ‘emerging alliance’ that will require careful 
monitoring, predicting that ‘the degree to which the Sino‐Russian 
alliance may become anti‐Western in future depends on how deeply 
the two Eurasian powers feel that the United States threatens their 
interests’ (Ariel Cohen). In his 2008 article Tom Wilkins concluded 
that the Moscow‐Beijing partnership was “a highly efficacious vehicle 
for coordinating Russo‐Chinese‐SCO security policy. Those who doubt 
its capacities and durability may be in for a shock as it increasingly 
exercises dominance in Central Asia and begins to wield powerful 
influence on the global stage”(Wilkins 378). 
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It seems that the latter view, emphasizing the potency of Russo‐
Chinese collaboration, is borne out by the developments in recent 
years: since 2012, there has been a steady increase in the depth and 
scope of the bilateral relationship. Of course, it would not be 
accurate to describe the Russian‐Chinese strategic partnership as an 
alliance yet, but the relationship is certainly growing stronger. One 
indication is the frequency of summit‐level meetings. In 2013 alone, 
Putin and Xi met five times.2) It was highly symbolic that Xi’s 
maiden visit abroad was to Moscow (in March 2013). Indeed, Russo‐
Chinese partnership, as it stands today, looks much more solid and 
efficient than some of Washington’s “treaty alliances”, such as, for 
example, the US‐Thailand alliance. 
What are, then, the main drivers of Sino‐Russian entente? First and 
foremost, it is predicated on shared hostility toward America’s 
hegemony in world politics. Viewing themselves as great powers, 
both Moscow and Beijing are loath to the idea that there should be 
the systemic hegemon who dictates and adjudicates global rules, 
particularly considering the fact that Russia remembers itself as 
having been a superpower, while China preserves the memories of 
the Middle Kingdom’s glory. From the balance of power perspective, 
it is only natural that two lesser poles should join forces against the 
preponderant player. 
Going down to the regional level of geopolitics, the US hegemony 
prevents Russia and China from enjoying dominance in what they 
2) Bilateral summit in Moscow; the BRICS summit in Durban; the G20 summit in 
St. Petersburg; the Shanghai Cooperation Summit in Bishkek; and the Asia‐
Pacific Economic Cooperation Meeting in Bali.  
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regard as their rightful domains. For Russia this is the post‐Soviet 
space, for China East Asia. 
Finally, there is an issue of identity. Both Moscow and Beijing see 
the US‐led West as the primary threat to their nations’ civilizational 
selves as well as legitimacy of their political regimes. Gilbert 
Rozman makes the compelling case that what pulls China and Russia 
ever closes together are their national identities containing significant 
elements of the shared communist legacy. Despite the lack of cultural 
affinity and trust, the Sino‐Russian identity gap is likely to remain 
much narrower and less obtrusive than the two nations’ respective 
gaps with the United States. For both states, the post‐Cold War era is 
best characterized as a struggle between two civilizations: theirs and 
the West. The fervent anti‐Americanism cements their partnership 
(Rozman).
(2) Russian rationale for entente with China
As noted earlier, since around 2012 Sino‐Russian partnership began 
to grow noticeably stronger, raising the question whether we may be 
seeing a full‐blown alliance being born. The main reason for the 
reinforced ties is that Russia and China have entered what is likely 
to be for them a prolonged period of heightened rivalry with the 
United States and its allies. 
Putin’s comeback for a third term in 2012 signified the end of the 
attempted, and failed, “reset” with the United States. Russia’s 
relations with the West deteriorated to the point where many started 
to speak of a Cold War 2.0. Annexing Crimea and intervening in 
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Ukraine, Putin crossed the Rubicon. Unwilling to sacrifice what it 
sees as its vital interests in Ukraine and elsewhere in the post‐Soviet 
space, Moscow began to brace itself for an extended confrontation 
with the West. In this battle, where main weapons employed by the 
West are economic sanctions, China’s support for Russia will be 
crucial. Unlike the superpower Soviet Union, which was capable of 
confronting the West on its own, contemporary Russia needs allies, 
of which China is by far the most important, especially in the 
economic realm. 
In the course of the Ukraine mess, signs began to emerge that 
Moscow was reconsidering the level of its partnership with Beijing. 
Whereas before the Ukraine situation an alliance with China was 
completely out of question, in 2014 it became a possibility. There 
was no better indication of that than Putin’s statements. In October 
2011, in an interview to Russian major TV channels, Putin dubbed 
China one of Russia’s “very serious partners” and dismissed any 
notion of “China threat”, but at the same time he ruled out Russian 
involvement in the “struggle” between China and the US, essentially 
proclaiming Moscow’s strategic equidistance between the two most 
powerful actors:
…however attractive mineral resources of Eastern Siberia and the Far East 
could be in the contemporary world, the main struggle is not about them. 
The main battle is for the world primacy, and in this we are not going to 
contend with China. In this China has other rivals. So let them deal with 
one another (Interview with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 2011).
Just two and a half years later, Putin’s evaluation of the strategic 
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partnership with China was palpably different: the sense of deliberate 
neutrality was gone. During his televised talk show – a highly 
scripted event with pre‐arranged questions from the audience – he 
was asked if it was possible to formalize Russo‐Chinese partnership 
‘as a military and political union.’ After extolling the excellent state 
of the bilateral relations, Putin’s response to the question was neither 
in the affirmative nor in the negative, which most probably was a 
subtle way of signaling that Moscow at the very least did not 
exclude entering into a more alliance‐like relationship with China: 
Speaking of our relations with China, they are progressing very 
successfully in terms of trust and collaboration, which are unprecedented… 
Generally, I think that the bloc mentality is a thing of the past. NATO was 
established as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and to the Soviet 
Union’s policy in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact was signed in response. 
The Soviet Union ceased to exist, but NATO remains. We are told it is 
changing and becoming more of a political organisation. But Article 5 is 
still in effect, which is an article on mutual military support. Who does 
NATO act against? Why is it expanding towards our borders? 
Are there plans to establish new blocs? I don’t know; we haven’t thought 
about this. But it is absolutely clear that we will be expanding collaboration 
with China. Our trade with the United States is 27.5 [billion], but trade with 
China is 87 billion, and it is growing. And experts will agree that China is 
gradually becoming the number one economic power. The question is when 
it will happen: in 15, 20 or 25 years. But everybody understands that it is 
inevitable…Therefore, we will certainly continue to develop relations with 
China. We have never had such trust‐based relations in the military industry. 
We began holding joint drills at sea and on land, in both China and the 
Russian Federation. This gives us reason to assume that Russian‐Chinese 
relations will be a significant factor in global policy and will substantially 
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influence modern international relations (“Direct line”).
A few months later, meeting with the head of the Chinese 
government, Li Keqiang, Putin stated that Russia and China were 
“natural partners and natural allies,” using the word “ally” that 
Moscow had shunned before with respect to Beijing (“Putin”). 
Similar changes in attitude were visible in Russia’s expert 
community. According to the surveys of foreign policy experts 
conducted by Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, in 2011 the 
majority of respondents believed that Russia should take a stance of 
neutrality in the Asia‐Pacific, but in 2013 most experts favored closer 
strategic ties with China, seeing Beijing as Russia’s main partner in 
the region (Abayev 135‐7).
(3) Chinese rationale for entente with Russia
Beijing demonstrated almost symmetrical desire for dramatically 
raising the level of bilateral strategic collaboration. By 2012‐13, there 
was little doubt left that China’s paramount external policy goal was 
to establish its own version of the Monroe doctrine in East Asia, 
which inevitably resulted in rising tensions with the United States. 
Relations between Beijing and Washington have been getting 
increasingly precarious and fraught. Regarding East Asia as its natural 
sphere of influence, resurgent China sees America as the only true 
force able to hamper its geopolitical aspirations (Wang 34). China 
seems more and more willing to do away with Deng’s maxims of 
cautious foreign policy and up the ante in its competition with the 
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United States over the primacy in East Asia and Western Pacific. 
However, even if China becomes, as widely predicted, the number 
one economy and manages to significantly reduce, or perhaps 
altogether eliminate, the military gap with the United States, this will 
not be enough to mount a viable challenge to the American 
hegemony. For China would have to confront not the United States 
alone but the U.S.‐led Asia‐Pacific bloc counting, among others, 
Japan, Canada, Australia, and perhaps India. Thus China needs at 
least one major‐power ally. Beijing currently has just one formal ally 
– North Korea, while Pakistan can be viewed as something of a de 
facto ally, at least vis‐à‐vis India. Although valuable to China, these 
countries can hardly be regarded as huge strategic assets. China lacks 
a dependable ally of a truly great power standing. The only candidate 
is Russia. The northern neighbor’s strategic depth, huge natural 
resources, military power, pockets of scientific and technological 
prowess all could be a significant force multiplier for China. 
If Sino‐American rivalry goes from its currently more or less 
subdued mode to an open clash, Russia would find itself in a pivotal 
position (Luttwak 141‐2). Even short of an alliance, good relations 
with Russia give China huge strategic benefits. First and foremost, it 
provides Beijing with “a stable strategic rear area” (Friedberg 170). 
With Moscow as a close friend, China can be confident about the 
security of its northern borders and can count on an unimpeded 
access to Russia’s natural resources. Thus Beijing becomes much less 
vulnerable to embargos and naval blockades that the United States 
and its maritime allies are sure to use against China in case of a 
serious confrontation. In an American blockade of China, Russia will 
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be the most important “swing state” and “could tip the balance of a 
blockade in favor of either China or the United States” (Mirski 10‐11).
Unlike outspoken Russian leaders, Chinese top decision‐makers 
almost never give substantive public comments on issues of foreign 
policy. Sentiments in China’s expert community and the media can 
be a surrogate indicator. In recent years, there have been rising calls 
among Chinese scholars to upgrade the partnership with Russia to a 
full‐scale alliance (for Chinese views arguing in favor of the alliance 
with Russia, see, for example, Yan; “US Actions”; Dai), while some 
news outlets posit that Beijing and Moscow are ‘allies’ without an 
alliance treaty (Mu). China’s first blue book on national security, 
commissioned by the government and written by scholars of the 
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, stated that 
China should consider forming an ‘alliance with Russia’ (“Terrorism”). 
Some Chinese analysts argue that the balance of power in Asia is 
already defined by the US‐Japan alliance versus China‐Russia 
coalition, with India and ASEAN swaying in between (Chen). The 
2014 pro‐democracy protests in Hong Kong made Beijing even more 
suspicious of the United States and strengthened China’s common 
cause with Russia on the anti‐American basis.
In 2003 Avery Goldstein argued that, since 1996 China had been 
pursuing a foreign policy similar to Bismarckian Germany’s 
diplomatic strategy:
China has attempted to build a series of relationships with other major 
powers that enhance its attractiveness as a partner while maximizing its own 
leverage and flexibility by not firmly aligning with any particular state or 
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group of states. Rather than explicitly identifying friends and enemies among 
principal actors on the international scene, China sought to establish 
partnerships with each as a way of binding their interests to China’s and 
reducing the likelihood that any would be able to cobble together a hostile 
coalition…(Goldstein 74) 
Goldstein goes on to point out the risk:
Should China’s relations with any of the major powers significantly 
deteriorate, especially if the international system does become truly 
multipolar, the remaining partnerships might be reinterpreted as de facto 
alliances (Goldstein 86). 
China has not abandoned this neo‐Bismarckian grand strategy as of 
yet, but its continuation looks much less certain than a decade ago. 
Should Beijing opt for an alliance with Moscow, this could set in 
motion dynamics very similar to what Europe witnessed in the run‐up 
to World War I. Then the Franco‐Russian agreements of 1891 and 
1894, creating their strategic alliance pitted against Germany and 
Austria‐Hungary, “marked a watershed in Europe’s rush toward war” 
by turning the balance‐of‐power diplomacy rigid and ushering in a 
zero sum game (Kissinger 181‐2). 
(4) Putin and Xi – two of a kind? 
The personalities of Russian and Chinese leaders, Vladimir Putin 
and Xi Jinping, are going to be a major factor in deciding the fate 
of a Russo‐Chinese alignment. They are two autocratic chief 
executives who have concentrated in their hands almost exclusive 
The Emerging Anti‐American Axis of Russia and China   29
powers to make foreign policy decisions. In case of Russia, there has 
never been much doubt that it is Putin who personally makes 
principal decisions on foreign policy and national security. In China, 
strategic decision‐making has until recently been done by the party‐
state collective leadership, but now Xi appears to be running the 
country’s diplomatic and security policies on his own, with 
Politburo’s Standing Committee playing very little role (Perlez).
Although Putin and Xi seem to get along quite well, it is hard to 
say if the two have personal sympathy for each other. In fact they 
do not even need to have good human chemistry between themselves 
– as long as they see eye to eye geopolitically. And it seems that Xi 
and Putin understand one another perfectly because they share the 
flair for hardball realpolitik in international affairs, coupled with a 
conservative and nationalistic authoritarianism in domestic affairs. 
Both men attach extremely high priority to military force and security 
apparatus as tools of defending national interests abroad and 
maintaining what they see as legitimate order at home. 
Gilbert Rozman writes of “striking parallels… in the ways in 
which Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin…were envisioning the 
resurgence of their countries domestically and internationally” (Rozman 
1). Another strong conviction shared by the two is that the West 
poses the main obstacle to grand projects of ‘Sinocentrism’ and 
‘Russocentrism.’ Thus Putin and Xi are drawn together as natural 
allies against the US‐led West. In this contest, matched against 
contemporary Western leaders with zero charisma and underwhelming 
foreign policy performances, the Putin‐Xi duo is going to be a 
formidable force. It is significant that Putin and Xi are here to stay 
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for a long time: Putin is likely to seek, and win, re‐election in 2018, 
while Xi will not quit until 2022 and in fact may continue to serve 
as China’s paramount leader beyond 2022. 
(5) The contours of a Sino‐Russian alliance
China and Russia see their crucial national interests as mutually 
non‐exclusive at the very least. As Dmitri Trenin observes, the Russia
‐China bond “is solid, for it is based on fundamental national 
interests regarding the world order as both the Russian and Chinese 
governments would prefer to see it” (Trenin 6). Moscow is not 
inimical to China’s rise as a great power as this creates for Russia 
economic and political alternatives other than the West. For its part, 
China sees its security interests as generally compatible with those of 
Russia (Li). This convergence of basic interests constitutes the 
foundation for strategic partnership. The existence of a common foe – 
the United States – may be transforming the partnership into a de 
facto alliance.3) Whether this ongoing conversion from partnership 
into alliance is actually completed will mainly depend on the 
intensity of Russian‐American and Sino‐American disagreements. Both 
Beijing and Moscow appear to proceed from the assumption that 
their antagonisms with Washington will not dissipate any time soon. 
If an alliance‐type relationship between China and Russia eventually 
arises, how might it look like? Its general patterns can already be 
3) The characterization of Russo‐Chinese relationship as a ‘de facto alliance’ is 
increasingly used by Russia’s leading foreign policy experts (See, for example, 
Karaganov).
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discerned. This is not necessarily going to be an alliance of the 
classical style designed for joint use of military force against other 
states for defensive or offensive purposes. The case against a Sino‐
Russian military alliance is simple: neither side actually needs it – at 
least for now.4) Russia and China are nuclear‐armed powers with 
formidable conventional armies, which makes them more than capable 
of independently guaranteeing their national sovereignty and, when 
necessary, projecting power in their perceived zones of influence. 
Thus the strategic value of the alliance will primarily lie in economic 
and diplomatic dimensions.
As a hot war between contemporary great powers is getting more 
and more problematic due to the enormous destructive force of 
nuclear warheads and other modern arms, warfare is migrating into 
the domain of trade and finance, as well as new ‘spaces’ such as 
cyber. In the twenty‐first century, economic sanctions, embargos, 
black lists and hacker attacks are becoming weapons of choice in the 
conflicts of major powers. This is what Russia has amply 
experienced in the Ukraine crisis. And this is what China may face, 
if and when it clashes with the United States. Thus mutual economic 
support becomes crucial for Moscow and Beijing. As noted earlier, 
the bond with China will give Russia a considerable degree of 
economic independence from the sanction‐prone West, while China 
will enjoy secure access to Russia’s vast reserves of natural resources 
so that its voracious economy can continue functioning even in the 
4) A military alliance between Russia and China is unlikely in the short‐to‐medium 
term, but cannot be ruled out 5‐10 years from now, provided the security 
situation in Eurasia continues to deteriorate. 
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case of a US‐imposed naval blockade. 
In terms of diplomacy, Moscow and Beijing will provide each 
other support in the geographic areas they deem their legitimate 
spheres of influence. Moscow will recognize East Asia as China’s 
domain, but will do so in exchange for Beijing’s support of Russian 
privileged interests in Eastern Europe and the post‐Soviet space.5) In 
fact, Russia appears to have already tacitly acknowledged the primacy 
of Chinese interests in East Asia. One of Russia’s leading experts on 
East Asia Georgy Toloraya laments that Russia shows passivity in 
the Asia‐Pacific affairs for fear that its more independent and pro‐
active stance might anger China. In particular, Russia has “almost 
accepted Chinese domination in Korean affairs” (Toloraya 104‐5). One 
indication of Russia’s unwillingness to behave as an active 
independent pole in East Asia can be found in Russian presidents’ 
consistent failure to show up at the annual meetings of East Asia 
Summits. Ever since Russia was admitted as a full member in 2011, 
Russian leader has not once made it to the summit which is seen as 
the region’s premier security forum (Artyom Lukin).
The summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence 
Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held in Shanghai in May 2014, 
underscored Russia’s growing, albeit still tacit, acceptance of China’s 
leading role in East Asian security. Xi Jinping’s statements at the 
summit were unusually blunt and specific, attacking the US‐led 
alliances in the Asia‐Pacific as “the outdated thinking of Cold War” 
5) Even before the Ukraine crisis, in 2008, a senior official of Russian foreign 
ministry admitted that China wanted Russia to keep low‐profile in the Asia‐
Pacific as a precondition for China not interfering with Russian interests in 
Central Asia (Alexander Lukin “Rossiya” 21).  
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and proclaiming that “security problems in Asia should be solved by 
Asians themselves,” (“China Focus”) leading many observers to 
suggest that China may now be ready to abandon Deng’s ‘lie low’ 
strategy and seek the dominant role in constructing Asia’s new 
security framework, in which America should play a very limited 
part, if any at all (Shimada). In comparison to Xi’s energetic 
rhetoric, Putin’s speech at CICA was bland, offering Moscow’s 
standard boilerplate on the need for “a new security architecture” in 
the Asia‐Pacific “that guarantees equal interaction and a genuine 
balance of power and harmony of interests” and is based on the 
“concept of indivisible security” (“Putin”).
The Ukraine crisis has made Russia more preoccupied with 
defending its interests Eastern Europe and reduced its ability to 
pursue whatever geopolitical ambitions it might have in East Asia. 
The more Russia gets bogged down in Ukraine and other post‐Soviet 
rivalries, the more it needs China and the more it defers to Chinese 
interests in Asia. Moreover, the Ukraine crisis diverts Washington’s 
attention from East Asia and eases American pressure on China, 
giving Beijing a freer hand in the region.6) Thus, from a cynical 
realpolitik perspective, it makes a lot of sense for China to tacitly 
encourage Russia to stand its ground in the conflict with the West. 
Central Asia will be another crucial area of Sino‐Russian 
diplomatic cooperation. Whereas China seems ready to recognize 
former Soviet states in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus as 
6) A Chinese general, former military attaché in Moscow, was reported as saying 
that, thanks to the Ukraine crisis, “China will get at least a 10 year respite in 
its global contest with America.” (Kashin) 
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Russia’s area of dominance, the post‐Soviet republics of Central Asia 
are likely to emerge as a condominium of Moscow and Beijing. 
Should they form an entente, Moscow and Beijing will have Central 
Asia, as well as Mongolia, to themselves, effectively shutting out all 
external powers from the heart of Eurasia.
If the current trends continue, what might ultimately emerge from 
a Sino‐Russian rapprochement is a Eurasian league, which, in 
controlling a continental heartland, would be reminiscent of the 
World War I Central Powers (Mittelmächte) alliance.7) It might also 
resemble Karl Haushofer’s notion of the anti‐Western “continental 
bloc” of Germany, the Soviet Union and Japan.8) In the first decades 
of the twenty‐first century, a Sino‐Russian entente could assume the 
form of a bilateral alliance or a multilateral pact, possibly based on 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization framework.9) 
3. Conclusion: Sino‐Russian strategic scenarios and 
America’s choices 
What are possible scenarios for further developments in Russo‐
7) The Central Powers were one of the warring coalitions in World War I. The 
two main participants of the Central Powers alliance were Germany and Austria‐
Hungary strategically located in the middle of Europe. 
8) The leading Nazi geopolitician Karl Haushofer put this idea forward in 1940. 
The continental bloc concept is almost forgotten in the West, but is well known, 
and increasingly popular, within Russia’s strategic community. 
9) Some scholars already see the SCO as a ‘Eurasian defense alliance’ led by 
China and Russia (Tse‐Hei Lee 16). 
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Chinese strategic relations and their impact on Asia? There are, of 
course, an infinite number of futures, but I would still identify three 
basic alternatives for the next 10‐20 years.
Russia’s retreat from Asia’s balance of power. This scenario is 
more or less an extension of the current situation. Russia continues 
to be in confrontation with the West over Ukraine and other related 
issues. Preoccupied with rivalry over Ukraine and the post‐Soviet 
space, Russia, and to some extent the United States, will be 
distracted from Asian affairs and have less political resources to deal 
with Asia. This will give China more freedom of action and alter the 
Asian balance of power in its favor. Furthermore, as Russia’s 
isolation by the West remains in place and probably stiffens, Russia 
will have to rely more on China economically. This would inevitably 
result in Moscow displaying more deference, albeit not subordination, 
to Beijing on security matters in the Asia‐Pacific. 
This scenario stops short of Russia and China forming a true 
alliance. They will remain in strategic partnership, but Russia will 
largely avoid supporting Beijing’s claims to the sphere of influence 
in East Asia and try to preserve for itself a modicum of strategic 
independence in Asia. In particular, Moscow will retain some options 
for strategic interaction with the Asian countries that Beijing 
considers its rivals, such as Japan, Vietnam, and India, although the 
extent of this cooperation will not be enough for Russia to play any 
substantial balancing role vis‐à‐vis China. 
Sino‐Russian alliance. This scenario envisions the continued 
strengthening of Moscow‐Beijing strategic partnership – to the point 
where it is transformed into a full‐fledged alliance, perhaps based on 
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a mutual defense treaty. As discussed above, this could take the form 
of Sino‐Russian condominium over the Eurasian heartland. The 
likelihood of this scenario is directly proportionate to the intensity of 
antagonisms between Russia and the United States, on the one hand, 
and China and the United States, on the other. It can materialize if 
Washington continues to pursue its policy of double containment – 
against both Russia in Eastern Europe and China in East Asia. Under 
such an alliance, directed against the United States and its allies, 
Russia would openly support Chinese assertions in Asia and the 
Western Pacific, while Beijing would back Moscow’s claims to 
hegemony in the post‐Soviet space. This would be an extremely 
dangerous development for Asia, Eurasia and the entire world, as it 
would again split the international system into two hostile alliances, 
reproducing many of the elements of the pre‐World War I and Cold 
War rivalries.
Russia balancing China. Under this scenario, which may be the 
most desirable but currently not the most likely, Russia and the West 
eventually resolve their conflict over Ukraine and normalize their 
relations to the point where meaningful strategic collaboration becomes 
possible. At the same time, Moscow preserves its strategic partnership 
with Beijing, but significantly deemphasizes its anti‐Western components. 
Having secured its Western flanks, Moscow could play a more 
active part in the Asian strategic game. This potentially gives Russia 
the option of being a significant independent element in the balance 
of power in Asia, if not a swing state, which will be greeted by 
most Asian states – who do not want to see the Asia‐Pacific 
dominated by a single‐power hegemony, be it China’s or America’s, 
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or divided into a bipolar structure of Beijing vs. Washington. 
Choices for America. In all of the above scenarios, the United 
States, still the only superpower and a formidable force in Asia and 
Eurasia, will act as the key and the most crucial variable. In essence, 
Washington has three choices.
First, it may continue to pursue the strategy of dual containment 
vis‐à‐vis both Russia and China. Ever since the 1990s, Washington 
has sought to counteract Russia in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and 
Central Asia, while confronting China in East Asia. However, it is 
becoming more and more doubtful that the United States has 
sufficient resources to efficiently pursue this containment strategy.
Second, the United States could prioritize either Russia or China as 
the main challenge and focus its efforts on containing this challenge, 
while reaching accommodation with the side identified as a lesser 
security risk.
Third, Washington may attempt to achieve accommodation with 
both Moscow and Beijing, perhaps forming a grand Eurasian concert 
of the three great powers. If the United States, Russia and China 
come to mutual understanding, it would set the stage for a benign 
version of multipolarity and later perhaps a multilateral architecture in 
Eurasia, in which not only Moscow, Washington and Beijing but also 
the majority of Eurasian stakeholders could be invested and engaged. 
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Abstract
The Emerging Anti‐American Axis of 
Russia and China: 
Implications for Asia
Artyom Lukin 
(Far Eastern Federal University)
Russia and China may now be experiencing a pivotal moment in their 
post‐Cold War relationship, which will determine whether their relations will 
shift from a non‐committal partnership to a strategic alliance. Being the two 
strongest powers on the Eurasian landmass, the state of Russia – China 
relationship is of profound significance for the world’s largest continent, and 
particularly for its Asian wing where Beijing displays growing ambitions. 
The paper investigates the evolution of Russo‐Chinese strategic relationship 
– from its beginnings in the mid‐1990s to the present, focusing on the 
motives that have lately been driving Beijing and Moscow ever closer, 
above all their respective antagonisms with Washington. It then goes on to 
assess possible implications that Sino‐Russian entente may have for Asian 
security order. In conclusion, three basic scenarios are sketched of future 
configurations in the Russia‐China‐US strategic triangle and their impact on 
Asia.
Key Words
international politics, Eurasia, Asia, Russia, China

